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Global social policy: An application of welfare state theory 
 
 
Abstract 
Global social policy (GSP) takes different forms from those of national welfare states, 
since it depends on the activities of an array of international organisations and 
transnational actors. Three broad theoretical approaches have dominated the literature on 
national welfare state development: those focused on processes of economic 
development, industrialisation and urbanisation; those focused on class struggle and 
political mobilisation; and those focused on the effects of political institutions. This 
article applies each of these broad theoretical approaches to the development of GSP in 
order to illuminate the nature of GSP, its likely future development, and the constraints 
upon such development. It is concluded that the dominant forms taken by GSP will 
continue to be piecemeal, minimalist and essentially neoliberal for as long as an effective 
global political movement in favour of a more extensive GSP is absent. 
 
Key words: global social policy; global social governance; welfare state theory; welfare 
state development 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Introduction 
 
There has been a substantial growth in the literature on global social policy (GSP) in 
recent years. Most authors acknowledge that the forms that GSP takes are distinct from 
those of national welfare states, since GSP depends on the activities of an array of 
international organisations and transnational actors (Yeates, 2014). Deacon (2006) has 
defined GSP as the mechanisms, policies and procedures used by intergovernmental and 
international organisations, working with other actors, to both influence and guide 
national social policy and to provide for a supranational or global social policy. In this 
second sense, GSP therefore constitutes global social redistribution, global social 
regulation and global social rights. Examples given by Deacon (2006) for each of these 
respectively that are already being developed include emerging mechanisms for global 
social transfers such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(GFATM); core labour standards and the United Nations (UN) global compact on 
transnational corporations; and the advancement up the UN agenda of social rights and 
their moniWRULQJ DQG HQIRUFHPHQW WKURXJK ³soft law´. Similarly, George and Wilding 
(2002, p. KDYHDUJXHGWKDW³global social policy will be multi-dimensional - a mix of 
regulation, redistribution, provision of services anGJXDUDQWHHLQJRIEDVLFULJKWV´  
 
A number of authors have argued for the development of more comprehensive 
and social democratic forms of GSP (Townsend and Donkor, 1996; Deacon et al, 1997; 
Mishra, 1999; Townsend 2002; Deacon, 2007). Yet most authors have acknowledged the 
currently fragmented and piecemeal structure of global social governance, dispersed as it 
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is across a wide array of actors and institutions (Kaasch and Martens, 2015). Furthermore, 
in a period of neoliberal hegemony, when global economic integration and its related 
governance structures are designed in such a way as to IDFLOLWDWH ³IUHH´ PDUNHWV DQG 
constrain social policy, it is particularly difficult to realise an expansive vision of global 
social policy.  
 
This article seeks to explicate in a systematic way why GSP has taken the forms 
that it has. Although these forms are different to the forms taken by national welfare 
states, and in part for that reason, the article contends that we can gain insight into why it 
takes the forms it does by applying theories of the development of national welfare states 
to the development of GSP. There are various explanations for welfare state development, 
but three broad approaches have dominated the literature (Huber at al, 1993): those 
focused on processes of economic development, industrialisation and urbanisation; those 
focused on class struggle and political mobilisation; and those focused on the effects of 
differing political institutions. In the following sections, each of these three theoretical 
approaches is applied to GSP, in order to illuminate the nature of GSP, its likely future 
development, and the constraints upon such development. While the article draws on 
empirical evidence, the primary contribution is theoretical. 
 
 
Economic development and global capitalism 
 
Early welfare state theory focusing on economic development and industrialization was 
 4 
largely functionalist in its approach, arguing that the welfare state is essentially the 
RXWFRPHRIWKH³QHHGV´ of industrial society (Wilensky, 1975, 1976). As Flora and Alber 
put it (1984, p. ³In the tradition of Durkheim, structural-functional differentiation is 
the fundamental process characterising modernisDWLRQ´ The key factors are therefore the 
increasing specialisation and division of labour associated with economic growth and 
industrialisation. Closely related to this are processes of urbanisation and increasing 
labour mobility as labour markets expand, which undermine ³ascriptive ERQGV´ and 
therefore the security functions of the family. Human relationships are increasingly based 
upon exchange rather than close informal ties. These processes are seen as leading to a 
number of social problems, which can only effectively be tackled by the state. The 
development of factories leads to a change in working conditions that is much more likely 
to result in industrial accidents; labor contracts may be unrestrained, involving long 
working hours or child labour; the question of income security for those not employed is 
raised, including disabled people, children and their carers, older people, and the 
unemployed. In order to respond to these pressures, the state must control, supplement or 
substitute for the market (Flora and Alber, 1984, p. 41). This does not mean the state is 
against the market; rather, the state plays a key role in facilitating the market as its own 
institutional capacity develops alongside the extension of market relations.   
 
On first consideration, the industrialisation thesis has little to tell us about GSP, 
since it suggests that welfare states will develop only where there is industrialisation. 
Thus, we may examine newly industrialised countries in order to see how social policy 
has developed in such countries and to compare this to the earlier processes of welfare 
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state development in Western Europe, for example, but there is little in the 
industrialisation thesis per se that would lead us to expect the development of GSP, 
particularly since industrialisHGFRXQWULHVUHPDLQDPLQRULW\RI WKHZRUOG¶VVWDWes. In the 
existing industrialisHG RU ³SRVW-LQGXVWULDO´) welfare states, and in the context of 
economic globalisation, the literature has analysed how the state plays a role in both 
protecting citizens from, and in enhancing, global competition (Esping-Andersen, 1999, 
1996; Cerny, 1990). Bonoli (2005) has also examined how the welfare state might adapt 
to incorporate the needs of new social risk bearers, in the context of more flexible labour 
markets and other developments. However, these are all national-level adaptations of 
existing welfare states.  
 
Nevertheless, on the basis of industrialisation theory, it is possible to identify 
circumstances where continuing economic or technological development has tended to 
lead certain industrial economies to become more closely integrated in a way that would 
have possible implications for the further development of welfare provision. In particular, 
greater labour mobility between nations rather than within them has lead to international 
cooperation through measures such as reciprocal agreements on social security 
entitlements and the portability of health insurance or treatment arrangements. This tends 
to take place through agreements between sovereign nation states, although there are also 
supranational arrangements which supersede this. 
 
Where this happens it is often on a regional basis, where similar and 
geographically adjacent countries become more economically interdependent. The best 
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example of this is the European Union (EU), where there is an explicit project to create a 
single European market. Common European trade policies, and particularly the creation 
of the single currency, are indicators of how far this process has gone. As Hirst and 
Thompson (1999) observe, the current period has seen the national state cede power both 
³XSZDUGV´ DQG ³GRZQZDUGV´, and in the EU this has led to a system of ³multi-level 
governance´ (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). Yet, while there have been some ³positive´ 
forms of social policy integration in the EU, aimed at creating common standards or 
policies, most EU social policy integration has taken a ³negative´ form; that is, it has 
been driven by efforts to remove barriers to competition and the single market, 
particularly in labour markets and social policies that affect them (Anderson, 2015).  
 
While the limited form of ³SRVLWLYH´regional social policy that can be observed in 
the EU might be argued to be consistent with the industrialisation thesis, this thesis has 
difficulty explaining global social transfers from industrialised to industrialising or 
mainly agrarian countries. Given its reductionist nature, the industrialisation thesis is not 
in any case a sufficient explanation of the development of national welfare states, let 
alone GSP. We therefore need to examine social and political relationships, rather than 
simply the level of economic and technological development. The next section discusses 
class struggle and political mobilisation (including, briefly, the potential for global 
alliances between industrial workers and farmers). Prior to that, however, those aspects of 
neo-Marxist welfare state theory concerned with the level of economic development are 
discussed.    
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Some approaches in the Marxist tradition have also contained a functionalist 
element, pointing to the role of the welfare state in maintaining a healthy and educated 
workforce capable of meeting the needs of advanced capitalism. However, Marxists have 
tended to emphasise the contradictory nature of the welfare state, in both attempting to 
meet the accumulation needs of capitalism while also legitimizing the system by meeting 
certain needs of the working class within it (2¶&RQQRU; Gough, 1979; Offe, 1984). 
These arguments culminated in an extensive literature concerning the apparent crisis of 
the welfare state in the 1970s and 80s. From a Marxist perspective, this crisis was often 
seen as a crisis of capitalism itself, prompting a debate about the role of the welfare state 
in a capitalist economy where growth rates significantly below those of the post-war 
period were coming to be seen as the norm. These analyses were written in a period 
largely prefiguring the phase of economic globalization that began in the 1980s. Barriers 
to international trade and investment have been substantially reduced during this period, 
in a process that might be conceived as an attempt to resolve earlier crises of national 
capitalism, but which in 2007-8 resulted in a global economic crisis. We might therefore 
ask whether there is something about capitalism in its globalising phase that suggests a 
need for some form of GSP.   
 
By the nature of such theories, there is little in either the industrialisation thesis or 
in the functionalist aspects of its Marxist equivalent that would lead us to expect 
capitalism to provide more than that which is functionally necessary for its continued 
existence and smooth working. However, it is possible to conclude that the existing low 
levels of GSP are not functional for capitalism.  This argument relates particularly to the 
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work of Polanyi and Marxist writers such as Muller and Neususs. Polanyi (2001) argued 
that the marNHW RSHUDWHG RQ WKH EDVLV RI D ³ILFWLRQ´ that labour was like every other 
commodity, in that it was produced solely for the purpose of exchange. This fiction meant 
that, without state intervention to provide social security for those who could not find a 
buyer for their labour, capitalism was unable to secure its own reproduction. Similarly, 
and following Mar[¶V DQDO\VLV in Capital (1976, pp. 389-416), Muller and Neususs 
(1978) argued that the English Factory Acts were necessary to ensure the reproduction of 
the labour force, since the unrestrained competitive struggle by the employing capitalists 
threatened to destroy it through long hours, dangerous working conditions and child 
labour. In other words, capitalism could destroy itself without state intervention. 
  
Current processes of globalisation require internationalising firms and their 
governments to pay greater heed to the political and social conditions of other countries, 
particularly developing ones. Processes of economic globalisation tend to widen 
inequalities both within and between countries (Holden, 2014a), and these may become 
dysfunctional if not moderated. If the transnational corporations (TNCs) of the developed 
world want to invest in developing countries, thus making use of the cheaper labour there, 
they must have stable conditions for investment and a fit and healthy workforce, and one 
with basic educational skills. It has been argued (by Cameron, 1978, for example) that 
welfare states expanded in order to respond to the social risks posed by more open 
economies. Thus, it can be argued that a more competitive global environment actually 
provides an imperative for welfare state expansion (Holden, 2014b) and, potentially at 
least, this might be the case at the international level as well as the national level. 
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Townsend (2002, p. 19), for example, has noted that growing international social 
SRODULVDWLRQ PD\ EULQJ ZLWK LW ³VRFLDO VHOI-GHVWUXFWLRQ´ From a Marxian perspective, 
&DPPDFN  S  KDV DUJXHG WKDW WKH :RUOG %DQN¶V DQWL-poverty policies are 
linked to the needs of capitalism, aiming DWWKHFUHDWLRQRI³DJOREDOSUROHWDULDWRQDZDJH
RIWZRGROODUVDGD\ZLWKDUHVHUYHDUP\RIODERXUDFWLQJDVDGLVFLSOLQDU\IRUFH´ 
 
The expansion of the global market without the complementary globalization of 
governance arrangements may also undermine state capacity at the national level, even 
where it advantages TNCs. The increased opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion 
evident in the contemporary global political economy provide one pertinent example. 
States and international organisations are struggling to effectively contain such processes, 
particularly via the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development¶V (OECD) 
³EDVH HURVLRQ DQG SURILW VKLIWLQJ´ SURJUDPPH 2(&'  :LOHQVN\ 1975; 1976) 
argued that as capitalism evolved so too did institutional capacity, and logically this may 
be the case at the global level too. Yet current international tax initiatives, such as those 
of the OECD, seem to fall short of what would be necessary to fully restore state capacity, 
and are not aimed at building global tax systems.  
 
Theories of economic development therefore provide some explanation for the 
emergence of forms of GSP aimed at ensuring stability and the incorporation of 
developing countries into the world market. They also point to aspects of the global 
political economy that may be dysfunctional, both for individual states and for the system 
as a whole, such as opportunities for tax evasion. However, such theories can do little 
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more than tell us whether the preconditions exist for the further development of GSP. 
Whether such developments take place and, crucially, the form they take, will be 
determined by political factors. The next section looks at theories of class struggle and 
political mobilisation, while the following section examines questions relating to political 
institutions.  
 
 
Class struggle and political mobilisation 
 
Most theories of welfare state development accord some importance to political 
mobilisation. For modernisation theory, the development of mass democracy was a key 
factor in the development of welfare states because it allowed working class demands to 
be heard (Flora and Alber, 1984) (although the development of the Bismarckian welfare 
state demonstrates that democracy is not a precondition for governments to make 
concessions to the working class). For T.H. MarVKDOO  WKH HPHUJHQFH RI ³VRFLDO
ULJKWV´ was the culmination of the development of citizenship. Marxist theories argue that 
welfare states developed partly to head off revolution or instability caused by mass revolt. 
OWKHU WKHRULHV VXFK DV .RUSL¶V ³power rHVRXUFHV´ model (1983), emphasise the 
importance of political parties to the development of welfare states.  
 
.RUSL¶V PRGHO WDNHV D OHIW VRFLal democratic approach, emphasising the 
importance of left parties and organisHGZRUNHUV¶PRYHPHQWVLQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKH
welfare state, particularly where left parties are able to gain and hold office over a long 
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period of time. As Pierson (2006, p. 31) puts it, in the power resources PRGHO³The more 
successful the forces of the organised working class, the more entrenched and 
institutionalised will the welfare state become and the more marginalised will be the 
principle of allocation through the PDUNHW´ Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 111) built on this 
approach in explaining the development of different welfare regimes. As Esping-
Andersen (1990) points out, it is not simply the overall level of welfare expenditure 
which is influenced by the relative power of left and other parties, but the type of welfare 
state that is created.  
  
This article does not attempt to measure in any precise way the current or likely 
future influence of left parties, but rather is concerned with the politics and ability to 
organise transnationally of those parties and movements that may be considered as part of 
WKH³OHIW´, and which therefore, in the past at least, would have favoured an expansion of 
the welfare state. Although it is not only left parties that have been associated with 
welfare state expansion, in a period when neoliberalism has been the dominant political 
ideology, it is a reasonable assumption that any radical welfare state expansion, including 
the further development of GSP, would be more likely to be associated with the left than 
with any of the other mainstream political currents.  
 
Globalisation has often been considered to have led to welfare state retrenchment 
at the national level, as national governments have had to take account of the increased 
mobility RI EXVLQHVVHV E\ FUHDWLQJ PRUH ³LQYHVWPHQW IULHQGO\´ environments (see, for 
example, Mishra, 1999). A more sophisticated approach, however, sees national 
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governments as both shaping and responding to growing economic interdependence, and 
in the process reconfiguring the welfare state, rather than simply cutting it back. It has 
been argued that such reconfiguration has led to the development of what may be called 
WKH ³FRPSHWLWLRQ VWDWH´. Phil Cerny (1990, p. 179) has conceptualised the competition 
state as the shift away from the maximisation of welfare within the nation to ³the 
promotion of enterprise, innovation and profitability in ERWKSULYDWHDQGSXEOLFVHFWRUV´. 
This entails not the withdrawal of the state from social and economic life, but rather a 
pivotal role for it in creating opportunities for the operation of the market. The 
³FRPSHWLWLRQ VWDWH´ model of social policy therefore seems to run counter to a social 
democratic variant of GSP, by seeking to align the national welfare state with the needs of 
a competitive economy, rather than to moderate the outcomes of global competition as 
social democratic aspirations for GSP would do.  
 
The competition state may take many forms, but mainstream left parties 
increasingly pursued a version of this from the 1990s onwards. While there are 
differences between social democratic parties across Europe reflecting differences 
between national political economies, a shift towards a more pro-business / pro-market 
stance took place from the 1990s, involving restrictions on the growth of public 
expenditure, and supply-side rather than demand-side approaches to unemployment (Hall, 
2002; Driver and Martell, 2002). It has been argued that such developments have led to 
social democracy suffering from what Finlayson (1999, p. 274) has called WKH³absence of 
a motivational ethical core´, or what Schmidtke (2002, p. 16) FDOOV WKH ³lack of a 
mobilisLQJ QRUPDWLYH JRDO´. The fight against global poverty and inequality has the 
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potential to provide such a mobilising goal. Furthermore, as Mishra argues (1999, p. 114), 
acting alone even powerful developed countries may not be able to resist pressures for 
deregulation and the scaling down of social standards which affect their own welfare 
systems. There is therefore a clear rationale for social democrats to take a more global 
approach to questions of social justice. However, despite the elaboration of a global 
social democratic vision by some academics (Patomaki, 2000; Held, 2004; Holden, 
2017), such platforms have not generally been adopted by left parties or mass 
movements.  
   
There has been a relative swing to the left in many countries following the 2007-8 
financial crisis, manifested in the growth of new left parties such as Syriza in Greece and 
Podemos in Spain, as well as in a shift to the left in some established social democratic 
parties like the British Labour Party. Yet the experience of Greece has demonstrated the 
difficulty of forging a common movement across countries, even within the EU 
(Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2015). No global movement with the coherence of the 
international socialist and communist movements that challenged capitalism prior to and 
during the creation of the first welfare states exists today. This has particularly been a 
feature of the world political situation following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
weakening of traditional forms of social democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, with Cerny 
(2010, pp. 128-156) arguing WKDW QHROLEHUDOLVP KDV EHFRPH D ³KHJHPRQLF SDUDGLJP´ 
There is evidence, nevertheless, that this neoliberal hegemony is beginning to weaken, an 
issue discussed further in the next section.  
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There are examples of trades unions organizing effectively on a transnational 
basis (Yeates, 2002, p. 78 2¶Brien, 2014, p. 135), and Evans (2010) outlines the 
considerable potential that exists for labour organisations to build on this. However, 
while there have been significant moves towards transnational organisation by both 
labour and business interests, as Farnsworth shows (2004), globalisation has increased the 
power of capital by increasing its mobility. At the global level in particular, the power 
and the demands of labour have so far generally been subordinated to those of business 
(Farnsworth, 2005). While most transnational labour organisations appear to have 
accommodated their demands to those seen as acceptable within the current pro-market 
consensus, transnational business has been more successful in having its preferences 
adopted by international organisations and governments alike. These preferences are not 
for the complete absence of social policy, but rather for social policy measures (for the 
most part at the national level) which enhance competitiveness and the skills of the 
workforce, while providing minimum levels of support for workers who genuinely cannot 
find work (Farnsworth, 2005).  
 
As Pierson (2006, p. 39-40) points out, there is substantial evidence that classes 
and social groups other than the traditional working class have played a major role in the 
development of welfare states, as have parties other than social democratic ones. In this 
FRQWH[W³the decisive element in the success of the social democratic welfare state project 
may lie in the capacity of the working class and social democratic parties to forge long 
term, majoritarian alliances in support of its decommodifying form of social policy´ 
(Pierson, 2006, p. 39-40). In particular, a number of writers have pointed out the 
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importance of agrarian interests in influencing welfare settlements (Esping-Andersen, 
1990, p. 30-31; Fahey, 2002; Carey, 2005). The nature of alliances between agrarian and 
other intrests is crucial in this respect, with alliances between agrarian interests and those 
of workers or social democratic movements likely to give rise to more progressive 
outcomes than agrarian alliances based on nationalism or with more middle-class 
interests. This would seem to be particularly important to the development of GSP, given 
the largely agrarian nature of many developing economies. Yet the forging of meaningful 
alliances between developed country workers and farmers on the one hand, and those in 
developing countries on the other, seems especially difficult. In particular, farmers in the 
developed countries (who often receive large subsidies from their governments) may see 
their interests as being diametrically opposed to those in developing countries. There may 
be some scope for transnational alliances of farmers, possibly together with workers, at 
the world regional level, given regional trade integration projects, such as that of the EU. 
However, even in the EU, such alliances may be difficult to form, when farmers often see 
their interests lying in maintaining subsidies rather than allying with worker interests, and 
agricultural and other workers from one EU member state may regard those from others 
as competitors for jobs rather than as allies.  
 
 One feature of the current period is the growth of civil society organisations and 
social movements. Smith and Wiest (2012, p. 46) estimate that the number of active 
international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) grew from less than 1,000 in the 
1950s to nearly 20,000 by the 2000s. Of this overall population of INGOs, the number 
committed to social change[1] increased from 127 to over 1,000 during the same period, 
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while the number of transnationally organised labour unions increased at a slower rate, 
from 39 to 87 (Smith and Wiest, 2012, p. 59).  Using the same data set, Kruse and 
Martens (2015) show that the numbers and resources of INGOs working on global social 
governance issues has also grown substantially during the post-war period, and that 
increasingly they do this within a broad global justice perspective.  
 
The creation of the World Social Forum (WSF) process in 2001 provided a means 
for such civil society groups to collaborate and constitutes a regular counterpoint to the 
PHHWLQJVRI WKHEXVLQHVVHOLWH¶V:RUOG(FRQRPLF)RUXP (Navarro and Silva, 2006). By 
the 2005 forum, the number of participants had increased to 155,000 (Navarro and Silva, 
2006) from 135 countries (Smith et al, 2016, p. 52), and regional, national and local 
forums have been held around the world. +RZHYHU WKH :6)¶V SXUSRVH LV WR SURYLGH
spaces within which ideas and tactics can be exchanged and developed, rather than to 
form a single movement with a common programme (Smith et al, 2016). Although 
understanding the connections between global and local processes, and seeing themselves 
as part of a global movement, WSF participants often see the strengthening of local 
communities as more important than national or global reforms (Smith et al, 2016, p. 
133). Furthermore, despite the participation of labour organisations and oppressed groups, 
students, professionals and those with higher levels of formal education are 
disproportionately represented at the forums, reflecting the structural barriers to 
participation by more marginalised people (Smith et al, 2016, pp. 58-61).  
 
Conceived at its broadest, the global movement against neoliberal capitalism 
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contains within it a spectrum of groups and opinions, from protectionist unions and small 
farmers in the developed countries to guerrilla groups and landless labourers in the 
developing countries. It is therefore most able to construct coherent coalitions when 
conducting focused single-issue campaigns (Yeates, 2002, p. 82). As Patomaki and 
Teivainen have noted (2004, p.  ³WKH PRYHPHQW´ has seldom gone beyond the 
teQGHQF\ RI VRPH SDUWLFLSDQWV WR ³name the enemy in order to unify the heterogeneous 
global civil society and create D EDVLV IRU HIILFDFLRXV DFWLRQV´, usually against the 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO LQVWLWXWLRQV ³7KHPRYHPHQW´ thus influences the course of GSP primarily 
by campaigning against what it finds unacceptable in the agenda of the international 
institutions and by challenging their legitimacy, rather than by promoting a common 
global vision. While important ideas, and specific platforms such as the G19 Declaration 
and the Bamako Appeal[2], have emerged from the WSF process, in line with the way the 
forums work, these statements are not endorsed by all participants within them and are 
QRWWKH³RIILFLDO´YLHZV of the forums. 
 
However, despite their largely undemocratic nature (discussed in the next 
section), international institutions have to some extent acted as a conduit for reform 
demands, much as national parliaments often did in the period of initial welfare state 
development. The DWWHQWLRQRI1*2VDQGVRFLDOPRYHPHQWVKDV VKRQHD³VSRWOLJKW´ on 
international institutions, with their activities now more closely monitored and visible to a 
wider public, a development that may exercise a brake upon some of the worst excesses 
of neoliberal policy. Furthermore, some civil society actors are increasingly engaging 
with international institutions in a more sophisticated way. In contrast to the increasingly 
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challenged legitimacy of the intergovernmental institutions, international NGOs often 
seem to carry particular legitimacy in the current period. The intergovernmental 
institutions, arguably therefore, do need to respond to this challenge to their legitimacy. 
Therefore, in order to understand more fully the forms of GSP that are emerging, and the 
scope for further development, we need to turn to an analysis of political institutions. 
 
 
Political institutions and international organisation 
 
Some writers have placed particular emphasis on the role of political institutions in the 
development of the welfare state (Flora and Alber, 1984; Immergut, 1992; Huber et al, 
1993; Bonoli, 2001, 2005). Institutionalists have pointed to the importance of both 
temporal aspects of institutional development, such as sequencing and path dependency 
(Pierson, 2004), and to the effects of different institutional configurations on policy 
outcomes. In regard to the latter, Bonoli outlines (2001, p. 239) how political 
constitutions which concentrate power with the executive branch of government have 
generally been found to be associated with big welfare states, whereas more fragmented 
political systems, which include a greater number of veto points within them, have tended 
to produce smaller welfare states. Fragmented systems, such as that of the USA, have 
provided opportunities for anti-welfarist groups to prevent the adoption of social policy 
programmes or water them down. However, the development of GSP is at least as 
dependent on international political processes as it is on those occurring in individual 
states.  
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Kaasch (2015) points out that GSP actors are not necessarily institutionalized in 
any narrow, constitutional, sense. Instead, a multiplicity of intergovernmental and non-
governmental actors are engaged in changing and often horizontal relationships with each 
other. As Kaasch notes (2015), to the extent that there is some kind of structured, 
hierarchical, system, this is provided by the United Nations (UN) system, which 
encompasses a wide range of intergovernmental institutions. While these institutions have 
a degree of autonomy within their specific areas of responsibility, veto points (and other 
means of influencing outcomes) therefore usually lie with national governments, and the 
capacity to utilise these is likely to reflect the differences in wealth and power between 
governments. A range of such international institutions may have a role in the current and 
future delivery of GSP, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Health Organisation (WHO) and 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (Deacon, 2007). The current UN-based 
system of global social governance therefore involves a range of overlapping and 
sometimes competing agencies. This fragmentation may exert a brake on the further 
development of GSP, in a manner that is consistent with the thesis outlined by Bonoli and 
others.  
 
At its creation in 1945, the UN was conceived as being at the apex of the 
international system, and its Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was to have 
coordinated the work of other agencies, including the IMF and the World Bank. However, 
the latter organisations are legally separate and in practice have operated independently 
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from the UN. Patomaki and Teivainen (2004, pp. 18-19) show how from the 1980s the 
USA has often both marginalised and subordinated UN agencies, partly through its 
dominance of funding. The role of the WHO in global health policy (Lee, 2009) and of 
other UN agencies in global poverty reduction (Hulme, 2015), for example, has tended to 
be challenged by that of the World Bank and IMF, primarily because of the extra 
resources the latter organisations can command. It is the World Bank and the IMF that 
provide the main existing mechanisms of global redistribution, and these transfers usually 
come with strings attached. The two organisations are fundamentally neoliberal in their 
approach. Together with the WTO, 2¶%ULHQHWDOS 233) have referred to them as 
³WKH LURQ WULDQJOH RI OLEHUDOLVP´ DQG QRWH WKDW WKHLU ³rule-creating and rule-supervisory 
GHFLVLRQV´ give them a degree of influence that contrasts with that of institutions such as 
the ILO ³which must rel\RQPRUDOVXDVLRQDQGDUJXPHQW´ (ibid, p. 11).  
   
The IMF provides a useful example of the importance of both a focus on path 
dependency in the historical development of institutions and of veto power, both of which 
privilege the USA. During its creation in 1944, the IMF was designed so that the 
decisions of its Executive Board were made based on weighted voting shares that reflect a 
member state¶V TXRWD ZKLFK LV HTXLYDOHQW WR WKH DPRXQW RI FDSLWDO FRQWULEXWHG WR WKH
)XQG¶V OLTXLGLW\7KH ,0)FODLPV WKDW LW IROORZV WKHSULQFLSOHVRIQRQ-discrimination in 
VHWWLQJPHPEHUV¶TXRWDVDQGWKHLUDVVRFLDWHGYRWLQJVhares. However, since the USA has 
the largest economy in the world, it has the largest quota and therefore the largest share of 
votes. Even after reforms agreed in 2010 to redistribute quotas and voting shares are 
complete, the USA will have 16.5% of total voting shares (IMF, 2016a). The gap in 
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voting power between the USA and other member states is illustrated by the fact that 46 
Sub-Saharan African states are represented by two Executive Directors with a combined 
voting share of 4.5% (IMF, 2016b; see also the volume edited by Carin and Wood, 2005).  
 
The IMF argues that decisions on loan conditionality are apolitical because 
agreements are drawn up by its staff on the basis of technical criteria. However, Momani 
(2004) has shown that the USA has intervened to secure its own specific foreign policy 
goals. IMF staff in any case work within a neoliberal ideology and culture which 
continues to VXERUGLQDWH VRFLDO SROLF\ JRDOV WR WKH ,0)¶V YLHZ RI ZKDW FRQVWLWXWHV
macroeconomic stability (Kentikelenis et al, 2016; Farnsworth and Irving, 2017). 
Furthermore, many important IMF decisions require the support of 85% of votes, giving 
the USA an effective veto. Decisions over which the USA can exercise its veto include 
measures to increase the number of Executive Directors and to adjust quotas. The USA 
therefore has a veto over precisely those measures that would be necessary to give 
developing countries more influence in the IMF and transform it in a more egalitarian 
direction. Even in those cases where only a simple majority vote would be necessary or 
where the Board makes decisions on the basis of an apparent consensus, the size of the 
US vote has proven essential in building winning coalitions. Meanwhile, the World 
%DQN¶V RUJDQLVational model is, as Patomaki and Teivainen put it (2004, p. 62), 
³essentialO\DUHSOLFDRIWKH,0)V\VWHP´  
 
On the face of it the WTO is more democratic than the IMF and World Bank, in 
that trade negotiations are conducted on the basis of bargaining and agreement between 
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nominally equal national governments. However, powerful states have utilised a range of 
measures to exercise influence over weaker ones, from greater access to expert advice 
during highly technical negotiations to direct threats and manipulation on a bilateral basis 
(Jawara et al, 2004). Furthermore, WTO dispute panels are composed of trade experts 
who reach decisions on the basis of a narrow interpretation of WTO rules, with little 
regard to social issues. The negative actual or potential impact of WTO agreements such 
as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on health and other areas of social 
policy have been well documented (see, for example, Correa, 2002; Price and Pollock, 
2003; Holden, 2014b).  
 
The emergence of important middle-income countries such as WKH ³%5,&S´
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has allowed some developing countries to 
take a more effective role in global social governance (Surender and Urbina-Ferretjans, 
2015). This has included the movement of the G20 to the centre of global governance 
following the 2007-8 financial crisis (Kirton et al, 2015) and %UD]LO¶V role in the 
formation of the Sustainable Development Goals (Hulme, 2015, p. 149). Brazil similarly 
played a key role in WKH ³*´ alliance on agriculture in WTO negotiations (not to be 
confused with the G20 previously referred to). Although such coalitions have tended to 
be transitory and subject to fragmentation in the past, the :72³G20´ was able to sustain 
an unprecedented level of cohesion in the Doha round of trade negotations (Narlikar and 
Tussie, 2004), although this has led to deadlock. However, while the growth of the 
BRICS¶ economies may in time threaten the dominance of the USA in institutions such as 
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the IMF, there is little evidence currently that these countries are likely to favour a more 
comprehensive approach to GSP. Similarly, while the creation of new development banks 
by these countries is threatening the hegemony of the IMF and World Bank as institutions 
(Hulme, 2015, p. 202), this process is at a relatively early stage. To the extent that it 
undermines the power of the IMF and World Bank, it will add to rather than decrease the 
fragmentation in international institutions. Furthermore, the stalemate in the Doha round 
led the USA and the EU in particular to seek to partially bypass WTO negotations, 
pursuing instead a number of bilateral and plurilateral negotiations, including the Trans-
Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP) and the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA). While putting some of 
these new agreements in doubt, the election of Donald Trump as US president is likely to 
further fragment the governance of global trade, as the US turns towards even greater 
bilateralism. The inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms in 
agreements creates a series of new veto points and gives rights to corporations to directly 
initiate disputes with governments (Hawkins and Holden, 2016).  
 
However, GHVSLWH WKHQHROLEHUDO ELDVRI WKH³LURQ WULDQJOH´ recent developments 
offer some evidence in support of  those who have highlighted the importance of ideas to 
international institutions and their changing practices over time (Boas and McNeil, 2004). 
The World Bank¶V social policies have moved towards a more comprehensive anti-
poverty and social protection strategy (Deacon, 2007, pp. 24-45; Hulme, 2015, pp. 178-
182), including in its 2012-2022 Social Protection and Labour Strategy (World Bank, 
2012). Similarly, since the financial crisis of 2007-8, the IMF has begun a re-examinition 
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of some of its core ideas, which has included a greater willingness to challenge the now 
extreme levels of inequality in many countries (Ostry et al, 2014), the acceptance of the 
benefits of public investment (Abiad et al, 2015), and even a questioning of some of the 
key tenets of neoliberalism (Ostry et al, 2016). Despite this, Nunn and White (2016) show 
that there has been relatively little change in IMF practice, at least in relation to 
inequality, while Farnsworth and Irving (2017) demonstrate that even ideational change 
has been limited. The IMF, the World Bank and the WTO have also increasingly engaged 
with social movements and civil society actors, leading to a greater degree of 
transparency and consultation, although this too has been limited 2¶%ULHQHW DO 
Woods and Narlikar, 2001; Scholte, 2012; Hannah etl al, 2017). ILO policy has shifted 
towards a more resident-based, rather than simply worker-based, model, especially 
through the development of the Social Protection Floors Recommendation (Deacon, 
2013).  
 
This tentative VKLIW LQ LGHDV DSSHDUV WR KDYH JDLQHG PRPHQWXP VLQFH WKH 8.¶V
referendum decision to leave the EU and the election of Trump to the US presidency in 
2016. The IMF, the World Bank and the WTO have, for example, published a joint paper 
for the G20 arguing for greater attention to the social policies necessary to mitigate trade 
adjustment (IMF, World Bank & WTO, 2017). Yet, despite an apparently genuine search 
for a new consensus on social policy, these ideas remain subject to the institutional 
constraints discussed above. While their emergence indicates the importance of ideas, 
they also arguably demonstrate the continuing importance of broader economic forces and 
of political mobilization, in that the extreme growth of inequality in a context of 
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economic crisis and stagnation is now seen as dysfunctional for the global economy, and 
may itself be seen as a factor underlying the political discontent manifested in the votes 
for Brexit and Trump (Holden, 2017). The political shifts represented by Brexit and 
Trump, while reflecting a shift to the right rather than the left, have been seen by 
defenders of the neoliberal global order as an unwelcome challenge, and may well be the 
cause of a partial rethinking of the neoliberal project in an attempt to head off discontent 
VHHIRUH[DPSOH2¶6XOOLYDQ.  
 
The important role that ideas can play in international institutions is linked also to 
the sometimes disproportionate role that individuals can play within them. Deacon 
(2013), for example, notes that this was an important aspect of the development of the 
,/2¶V6RFLDO3URWHFWLRQ)ORRUV5HFRPPHQGDWLRQ  However, despite significant elements 
of multi-level governance (Cerny, 2010), and the partially autonomous capacity to act of 
international bureacrats, the enduring importance of the nation state within the world 
polity makes substantial transfer from the richer parts of the world to the poorer ones 
difficult, although not impossible. The development of the very idea of GSP challenges 
the normative bases of social policy and of welfare states as they have developed, which 
have primarily been about redistribution within states rather than between them. This has 
been reflected historically in the academic subject of Social Policy, which until relatively 
recently had largely ignored questions of international development and global social 
justice. It is also reflected in the fact that while domestic social expenditure constitutes 
the largest element of public expenditure in the advanced capitalist countries, very few 
such countries have reached the UN target of 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) for 
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international development assistance. While mean public social expenditure in OECD 
countries was 21.6% of Gross Domestic Product in 2014 (OECD, 2016), net official 
development assistance by members of the 2(&'¶V Development Assistance Committee 
was 0.29% of GNI in the same year (OECD, 2015).  
 
Given the prevalent discourse within economically advanced countries about the 
affordability of welfare states and the need for fiscal consolidation following the 2007-8 
financial crisis, a substantial rise in international redistribution is unlikely in the absence 
of a strong political movement in favour of it. However, global coalitions in favour of 
GSP are difficult to form. As argued above, to be more effective the global movement 
against neoliberalism would need to develop a clearer agenda. Moreover, those that stand 
to gain most from the further development of GSP are the poorest citizens of low-income 
countries, that is, of those states with the least power in the international arena. While 
there are also some positive signs within the developed world of a desire to effect greater 
global redistribution, and that emerging middle-income countries may be able to play a 
progressive role, in the current political climate progress is likely to be slow. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
By its very nature, GSP takes different forms to those of national welfare states, and often 
must therefore be analysed using different concepts and approaches than those applied to 
national welfare states. Nevertheless, this article argues that by applying the broad 
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theoretical approaches of the literature on national welfare-state development, we can 
illuminate the nature of GSP and gain insight into the reasons why it takes the forms that 
it does. The analysis suggests that the forms taken by GSP will continue to be piecemeal, 
minimalist and essentially neoliberal for as long as an effective global political movement 
in favour of a more extensive GSP is absent. A basic form of GSP exists based upon the 
institutions set up at the end of World War Two, and the increasing integration of the 
world economy provides a material basis for its further development, in that as capitalism 
develops at the global level it increasingly ³needs´ mechanisms of regulation and 
governance which operate at this level. However, responsibility for social policy at the 
global level is currently fragmented across a number of institutions, and those that control 
most resources are currently structured so as to limit their use for more progressive and 
extensive GSP goals. Rather, their structuring reflects the existing balance of power 
within the world political economy, in which, despite important changes as a result of 
globalising processes, the nation state remains the primary political form. The inequalities 
of power that exist between states mean that the policies pursued by the most powerful 
states may not even be those that seem to be functional for the system in the long-term, 
but those that are in the perceived short-term interests of the most powerful. Moreover, 
given the attempts in advanced capitalist states to contain the expansion of the (national 
level) welfare state, there will be stiff resistance to proposals for the funding and 
maintenance of more extensive structures of global social redistribution, regulation and 
rights.  
 
Ultimately, the building of a more progressive and extensive GSP is a political 
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project. Deacon has pointed to the work of Gill (1993, 2003) and Cox (1995) concerning 
the necessity and possibility of building a new counter-hegemonic bloc in the pursuit of a 
post-neoliberal world order, that may be constituted from a global alliance between 
progressive forces in the developed and developing world, and that may involve both 
governmental and civil society forces (Deacon, 2006). For those in favour of a more 
progressive and extensive GSP, the task articulated in the following quote by Cox, 
highlighted by Deacon (2006, p. 144), is surely accurate: 
 
to bridge the differences among the variety of groups disadvantaged by 
globalisation so as to bring about a common understanding of the nature and 
consequences of globalisation, and to devise a common strategy towards 
subordinating the world economy to a regime of social equity. (Cox, 1999, p. 26) 
 
 
Notes 
 
[1] Smith and Wiest (2012) analysed the Yearbook of International Organizations for 
odd-numbered years from 1953 to 2009, to determine whether the primary purpose of the 
organization was the pursuit of social change. To be included, the group had to be 
identified as committed to social change, not-for-profit, and not directed or led by a 
government or international agency. Full details can be found in Smith and Wiest (2012), 
Appendix 2.A1, pages 70-71.  
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[2] The G19 declaration was a series of action proposals developed by 19 prominent 
intellectuals, which was published during the 2005 World Social Forum in Porto Alegre. 
The Bamako Appeal was a longer discussion of proposals by a larger group of 80 
SURPLQHQW ILJXUHV DW WKH  ³SRO\FHQWULF´ :RUOG 6RFLDO )RUXP LQ %DPDNR 0DOL
Discussion of these can be found in Smith et al (2016, pp. 102-105).  
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